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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

TERRI ANN PEATROSS aka TERRI
ANN DELICf dba HEIDI'S MASSAGE,

'
i

Plaintiff and Appellant,
1

vs.
*

SALT LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, WILLIAM
E. DUNN, RALPH Y. McCLURE, and
PETE KUTULAS, as Commissioners
and DELMAR LARSON, Salt Lake
County Sheriff,

Case Nos. 14325
and 14265

•

'
'
f

Defendants and Respondents '
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff-appellant initiated this action in the lower
court to obtain a de novo review of the revocation by the Board
of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County of her business license
to operate a massage parlor in Salt Lake County; also to challenge
the constitutionality of Sections 15-18-6, 10, and 11 of the
Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake County, 1966, as amended.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
After a license revocation hearing was held on April 10,
1975, wherein the Board of County Commissioners voted to revoke
plaintiff-appellant's license for allowing an employee to offer
sex acts for hire, she petitioned the lower court in Case No.
14265, for a de novo trial regarding the revocation of her license.
The lower court in its first hearing, treated plaintiff-appellant's
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

complaint as an extraordinary writ, and ruled that her license
was improperly revoked, after one Board member, who was not
present at the hearing, and after reading the record, voted
to revoke, plaintiff-appellantfs license.

Plaintiff-appellant

then appealed to this Honorable Court, the lower court's treatment
of her complaint as an extraordinary writ of review*
A second license revocation hearing was then held on
September 22, 1975, before all three of the County Commissioners
to reconsider the previous grounds for revocation, plus two additional grounds. A majority of the Board voted in favor of revocation of plaintiff-appellant's license, and she then petitioned
the lower court, in Case No. 230771 for a de novo trial regarding
the second revocation of her license.

The lower court dismissed

plaintiff-appellant's petition for a de novo review of her business
license, and granted her 10 days to file an extraordinary writ.
Plaintiff-appellant then elected to appeal the denial of her
complaint which sought a de novo trial, rather than filing an
extraordinary writ.
^

On November 17, 1975, this Court consolidated both appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-appellant seeks reversal of the lower court's

dismissal of her complaint in Case No. 230771, wherein she sought
a de novo trial, regarding the revocation of her business license
by the Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County, and a
remand to the lower court for a ruling as to the constitutionality
of Section 15-18-6, 10, and 11 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt
Lake County, 1966, as amended.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 10, 1975, a two man quorum of the Board of
County Commissioners of Salt Lake County met to consider the
suspension, or revocation, of the business license of Ms,, Terri
Anne Peatross dba Heidi's Massage (Minutes R. 69). After one of
plaintiff-appellant's employees, Susan Anderson, testified at the
hearing that she performed "locals", while nude, for customers
while employed by plaintiff-appellant (Minutes R. 69-70); plaintiff-appellant testified that she was aware of the provisions of
Sections 15-18-6 and 10 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake
County, 1966, as amended, prohibiting this type of activity and had
instructed her employees not to perform these acts (Minutes R. 70).
When asked by Commissioner McClure whether she had a system of
checks to insure that the ordinance provisions were complied with,
plaintiff-appellant testified that she made inspections, but wasn't
there all of the time, so that the girls were pretty much on their
own (Minutes R. 70). The matter was then taken under advisement by
the Commission (Minutes TR. 71).
On April 15, 1975, at a regular meeting before the entire
Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake, a vote was taken regarding revocation of plaintiff-cippellant's business license. At this
meeting, Commissioner Dunn abstained from voting since he was not
present at the April 10, 1975 hearing; the other two Commissioners
split their votes, one voting to revoke, the other voting not to
revoke, (Minutes R. 73). Commissioner Dunn then asked to read the
record of the hearing and agreed to also vote on the matter.
'
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'

'

•
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'
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•
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•

After reading the minutes of the April 10, 1975 license revocation hearing, Commissioner Dunn, on April 24, 1975, voted to
revoke the plaintiff-appellant's license (Minutes R. 72).
On June 18, 1975, Findings of Fact and an Order revoking
plaintiff-appellant's business license were signed by the Board of
County Commissioners (Findings of Fact and Order R. 74).
On July 7, 1975, plaintiff-appellant filed, and subsequently
amended, a verified complaint and a notice of appeal, seeking a
de novo trial regarding the revocation of her massage parlor license.
Defendants-respondents then moved to dismiss plaintiff-appellant's
amended complaint on the grounds that she was not entitled to a de
novo hearing regarding the revocation of her license (R. 26). On
July 31, 1975, in a memorandum decision, the Honorable Bryant H.
Croft ruled that the plaintiff-appellant was not entitled to a de
novo hearing, and that he was treating plaintiff-appellant's amended
complaint as an extraordinary writ.

He set aside the revocation

because of irregularities in the voting procedures engaged in by
the Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County (Memorandum
Decision, R. 56).
Plaintiff-appellant then filed an appeal from the subsequent order denying her application for a trial de novo.

(Notice

of Appeal, R. 114). The entire County Commission then proceeded
to rehear the original complaint plus two new and independent
grounds for revocation, after plaintiff-appellant's motion to stay
the rehearing was denied (Order, R. 115).
On September 22, 1975, a second hearing before the three
County Commissioners was held to consider the suspension, or revoDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-4-

cation, of plaintiff-appellant's business license on the grounds
that:

1)

Susan Anderson, an employee of plaintiff-appellant,

agreed on February 19, 1975, to massage for hire, while nude, the
genital area of a Salt Lake County Sheriff's undercover officer,
contrary to Section 15-18-6 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt
Lake County, 1966, as amended;

2)

that on or about July 17, 1975,

another employee, Susan Langston, worked as a masseuse at Heidi's
Massage Parlor, without having obtained a masseuse license, contrary to Section 15-18-2 and 10 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt
Lake County, 1966, as amended; and 3)

Kim Le Coure, another employee

of plaintiff-appellant, agreed, on July 17, 1975, to massage for hire,
while nude, the genital area of a Salt Lake County Sheriff's undercover agent, contrary to Section 15-18-6 of the Revised Ordinances
of Malt Lake County, 1966, as amended (Notice of Hearing, R. 2 9 ) .
Section 15-18-2 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake
County, 1966, as amended, reads as follows:
"Sec. 15-18-2. License Required. It shall be
unlawful for any person to operate, conduct, carry
on or maintain a massage parlor or engage in the
business of a masseur in Salt Lake County without
first obtaining a license to do so."
Section 15-18-6 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake
County, 1966, as amended, reads as follows:
"Sec. 15-18-6. Unlawful Conduct. Masseurs,
masseuses, massage parlor licensees or their employees
shall not perform the following acts or offer or agree
to perform the following acts on any customer, patron
or other person receiving or desiring to receive their
services:
(1) Sexual acts prohibited by Part 13, Chapter 10,
Title 76, Utah Code* Annotated, 1953, as amended.
(2)

The removal of clothing by a masseur or
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masseuse so as to display the female breast or
breasts, or genital area of either sex, or the
wearing of clothing that intentionally reveals
the same.
(3)

Any touching of the genital area,

(4) Allowing the customer to massage, touch or
fondle the masseur or masseuse.
(5) No massage shall be given in a locked room
or enclosure."
Section 15-18-10 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake
County, 1966, as amended, reads:
"Sec. 15-18-10. Revocation or Suspension of
License. Any unlawful conduct, whether the omission
to perform an act required by this ordinance, or any
act prohibited by this ordinance shall be cause for
revocation or suspension of a massage parlor licensee's
or masseur's license. The holder of a massage parlor
license shall have his license revoked or suspended
for any and all acts or omissions of his employees,
which are either prohibited or required by any
provision of this ordinance.
Any license granted under this title may be suspended or revoked by the County Commission for cause
as set forth in this title. A minimum of five days
notice shall be given to the licensee advising him of
the date and time for hearing and listing the cause
or causes for such suspension or revocation. If such
cause also constitutes a criminal act in violation of
the Revised Ordinances of Salt take County or in
violation of the laws of the State of Utah, such hearing will be heard independently of such criminal
charge and shall not be dependent in any way upon the
filing of or conviction of such charge or charges.
Section 15-18-11 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake
County, 1966, as amended, reads:
"Sec. 15-18-11. Penalties. In addition to the
revocation or suspension of licenses outlined above,
a person convicted of any violation of this ordinance
shall be fined not to exceed $299.00, or imprisonment
in the Salt lake County Jail not to exceed six months,
or both."

-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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At the hearing, Deputy Richard Sourez testified that
Susan Anderson agreed to take off her clothes and massage his genitals
for $20.00 (Minutes, R. 19). Also presented in evidence was a certificate from Justice of the Peace, Charles A. Jones wherein he certified
that, 1)

Susan Langston pleaded guilty to a charge of working without

a masseuse license on July 17, 1975, in Docket #468-093A; and 2)
Kim Le Coure, aka "Tammy", while working for plaintiff-appellant,
pleaded guilty to unlawful conduct prohibited under Section 15-18-6
of the Revised Ordinances of Salt lake County, 1966, as amended, for
her arrest on July 17, 1975, for offering to massage for $15.00, while
nude, the genital area of Deputy Sourez (Minutes, R. 20 & 28).
After the hearing of September 22, 1975, Commissioners
Dunn and McClure voted to revoke plaintiff-appellant's license; Commissioner Kutulas voted not to revoke her license (Minutes, R. 24).
The license was ordered revoked.
On October 1, 1975, Findings of Fact and an Order revoking
plaintiff-appellant's business license were then signed by the
Board of County Commissioners (Findings of Fact, R. 33).
On October 2, 1975, plaintiff-appellant filed a verified
complaint and notice of appeal, seeking a de novo trial regarding
the revocation of her license. Defendants-respondents then moved
to dismiss plaintiff-appellant's complaint on the grounds that she
was not entitled to a de novo hearing of the revocation of her
license (R. 18). On October 22, 1975, the defendants-respondents'
motion to dismiss was granted, on the grounds that plaintiffappellant's first and second causes of action seeking a de novo trial
were not proper, inasmuch as plaintiff-appellant was only entitled
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to a judicial review of the record of the prior license revocation
hearing, pursuant to Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;
further, that plaintiff-appellant's third cause of action, seeking
a declaratory judgment, would not terminate the uncertainty or
controversy over the revocation of her business license (Order
R. 60). Plaintiff-appellant was then given 10 days by the lower
court, to amend her third cause of action in order to file an
extraordinary writ, under Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which would permit a review of the revocation of her license
by the Board of County Commissioners (Order, R. 60).
Plaintiff-appellant elected, instead, to file an appeal
to the Utah Supreme Court, rather than to petition for an extraordinary writ.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S APPEAL FROM
THE REVOCATION OF HER BUSINESS LICENSE
BY THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
IS LIMITED TO A JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE
RECORD, BY FILING AN EXTRAORDINARY WRIT
The right to appeal, in the absence of a governing constitutional provision, may be granted, or withheld, at the discretion
of the legislature, and does not exist unless specifically granted
by statute; see Re Grant, 44 Utah 386, 140 P. 226 ( 1 9 1 4 ) — in this
case, the concurring Justices, Straup and Frick, were even of the
opinion that where a statute failed to provide for an appeal from
the revocation of a liquor license by the lower courts, or boards
of trustees, commissioners, and city councils, there is no right of
\ appeal. Consequently, appellant<s right of appeal is limited to that
provided by the legislature, or by the constitution.
Under the present Rules of Civil Procedure, the only manner
provided for reviewing the revocation of a business license by the
Board of County Commissioners is defined by Rule 65B, which is comparable to an extraordinary writ.
Rule 65B. Extraordinary Writs

:

»"•':•-••';.."'•'

"(a) Special Forms of Writs Abolished. Special
forms of pleadings and of writs in habeas corpus,
mandamus, quo warranto, certiorari, prohibition, and
other extraordinary writs, as heretofore known, are
heretofore abolished. Where no other plain speedy
and adequate remedy exists, relief may be obtained
by appropriate action under these rules, on any one
of the grounds set forth in subdivision (b) and (f)
of this rule.
(b) Grounds for Relief. Appropriate relief may
be granted:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(2) Where an inferior tribunal, board of officer
exercising judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion; or
\

(3) Where the relief sought is to compel any
inferior tribunal, or any corporation, board or
person to perform an act which the law specially
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust
or station; or to compel the admission of a party to
the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which
he is entitled and from which he is lawfully excluded
by such inferior tribunal or by such corporation,
board or person; or
(4) Where the relief sought is to arrest the
proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board or
person, whether exercising functions judicial or
ministerial, when such proceedings are without or
in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board of person." (Emphasis added)
Therefore, where minutes of the license revocation hearing

were transcribed from tape recordings which captured and preserved
the complete record of the hearing (Minutes R._20), appellant is
limited to a judicial re-examination of that record, via a writ of
review; see Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Co,, et al. vs.
Central Weber Sewer Improvement District, et al., 4 U. 2d 105, 287
P. 2d 884 (1955).
Even conceding, for the purposes of argument, that the
Board of County Commissioners acts as a "tribunal" when it revokes
a business license, the plaintiff-appellant would only be entitled
to a review of the record by the district court, under the provisions
or Article VIII, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah, which reads:
"The District Court shall have original
jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal
not excepted in this Constitution, and not prohibited by law: appellate jurisdiction from all
inferior courts and tribunals, and a supervisory
control of the same . . . "
(emphasis added)
-10Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"Appellate jurisdiction is the jurisdiction to
review the decision or judgment of an inferior tribunal,
upon the record made in that tribunal, and to affirm,
reverse or modify such decision; judgment or decree."
See State vs. Johnson, 100 U. 316, 114 P. 2d 1034 (1941)
Consequently, the lower court did not err in dismissing
the plaintiff-appellant's complaint which sought a de novo trial
concerning the revocation of her license by the Board of County
Commissioners.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT WHICH
SOUGHT DECLARATORY RELIEF
Under Section 78-33-6, U.C.A., 1953, as amended, the trial
court is given wide discretion to refuse to enter a declaratory
judgment, where such judgment would not terminate the uncertainty
giving rise to the proceeding.

••'

"78-33-6. Discretion to deny declaratory relief.—
The court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory
judgment or decree where such judgment or decree, if
rendered, would not terminate the uncertainty or
controversy giving rise to the proceeding."
Therefore, where the quasi-judicial revocation of plaintiff-

appellant's business license was appealable to the district court
via an extraordinary writ of review pursuant to Rule 65B of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, the district court did not err in denying
her complaint which sought declaratory relief and asked to review
the actions of the Board by testing the constitutionality of the
ordinances, which were the basis for revoking plaintiff-appellant's
business license; see Johnson vs. Yeilding, 267 Ala. 108, 100 So. 2d
29 (1958); and Miami vs. Eldridge (Fla. App.) 126 So. 2d 169 (1956).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Especially, where the Court in its order dated October 22, 1975,
allowed plaintiff-appellant 10 days to amend her complaint to
petition for an extraordinary writ of review.
Nor was plainiff-appellant entitled to challenge the constitutionality of the ordinances under which she was licensed.

It

is a well accepted rule of law that a person who obtains a license
under a law, and for a time enjoys the benefits thereof,cannot
afterward question the constitutionality of the ordinance, when the
license is sought to be revoked or suspended.

For cases following

this rule, see: Thomas J. Molloy & Co. vs. Berkshire, (1944, CA2 NY),
143 F. 2d 218, cert, den 323 U.S. 802, 89 L. Ed. 640, 65 S.Ct. 559,
reh. den. 324 U.S. 886, 98 L.Ed. 1436, 65 S.Ct. 711; Eichholz vs.
Hargus, (1938, DC Mo.), 23 F. Supp. 587, affd in 306 U.S. 268, 83
L.Ed. 641, 59 S.Ct. 532, reh. den. 306 U.S. 669, 83 L.Ed. 1063;
Gregory vs. Hecke, 73 Cal. App. 2d 268, 238 P. 787 (1925); Wong
vs. Public Utilities Commission, 33 Hawaii 813 (1936), Crittenden
County vs. McConnell, 237 Ky 806, 36 S.W. 2d 627 (1931); Appeal
of Bornstein, 126 Me. 532, 140 A. 194 (1928); Criscuolo vs. Department of Public Utilities, 302 Mass. 438, 19 N.E. 2d 708 (1939);
Morley vs. Wilson, Police Commissioner, 261 Mass. 296, 159 N.E. 41,
cert. den. 276 U.S. 625, 72 L. ED. 738, 48 S.Ct. 320 (1927); Williams
vs. Mack, 202 Minn. 402, 278 N.W. 585 (1938); State ex rel. Kehr vs.
Turner, 210 Mo. 77, 107 S.W. 1064 (1908); Cofman vs. Ousterhous, 40
N.D. 390, 168 N.W. 826, 18 ALR 219 (1918); State ex rel. Bluemound
Amusement Park, Inc. vs. Milwaukee, 207 Wis. 199, 240 N.W. 847,
79 ALR 281 (1932); and Schutt vs. Kenosha, 258 Wis. 83, 44 N.W. 2d
902 (1950).

For an excellent discussion of this rule and the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
i may
o_ contain errors.

above case, see 65 ALR 2d 660.
In conclusion, where the certified record indicates that
the plaintiff-appellant had a license to do business in Salt Lake
County, and was doing business in Salt Lake County at the time of
the license revocation hearing, she is now estopped from challenging
the constitutionality of the ordinances under which she was licensed;
further, the lower court did not err in dismissing her complaint,
seeking declaratory judgment.

Indeed, had plaintiff-appellant wanted

to challenge the ordinance provisions, she should have first paid
her license fees under protest, and then sought declaratory relief;
instead, she chose to operate, pursuant to three ordinances and then
to bring suit to challenge the same after the County Commission took
steps to, and did, properly revoke her license.
CONCLUSION
The lower court did not err in dismissing plaintiffappellant's complaint seeking a de novo trial to review the revocation
of her business license by the Board of County Commissioners of Salt
Lake County.

Plaintiff-appellant is only entitled to judicial review

by the lower court of the record of the proceedings before the Board
of County Commissioners, and therefore the dismissal of her complaint
should be affirmed.
Nor was the plaintiff-appellant entitled to challenge the
constitutionality of the ordinances under which she operated prior to
the revocation of her business license.

Consequently, when she

elected not to file an extraordinary writ pursuant to Rule 65B of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to review the actions of the Board of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter••,:.:•
Law Library,
Clark Law School, BYU.
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County Commissioners, she is estopped from challenging the validity
of the proceedings and the constitutionality of the ordinance provisions.
Respectfully submitted,

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Salt Lake County Attorney
DONALD SAWAYA
Chief Civil Deputy County Attorney
MARCUS G. THEODORE
Deputy County Attorney
Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents
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